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ABSTRACT 
The United States has spent over $2 billon during the last six years to reconstruct 
and stabilize Afghanistan through the Commander‟s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP).  This effort is only one of several simultaneous programs 
attempting to stabilize Afghanistan using approaches including providing 
humanitarian aid, education, government and security reform, and construction.  
Construction often involves simple infrastructure development with tangible 
benefits including increased access, growing commerce and better security.  
Construction projects can also employ the local population and, if done correctly, 
develop a sense of community and social capital.  What causes construction 
projects to miss the mark failing to result in creating a stable community? 
 This research compares four different construction programs including 
CERP, National Solidarity Program (NSP), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to determine 
their potential impact on Afghan stability.  It uses a combination of statistical 
regression, correlation, geospatial and temporal analysis to compare completed 
construction with recorded SIGACTs (Significant Acts) reported by U.S. forces 
and NGOs.  The results imply that the identified stabilization programs are not 
using construction effectively to create social capital and stability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Failed states are changing the world.  Globalization has made it virtually 
impossible for a country to be sheltered from the problems generated by failed 
states.  These broken states are a hazard, supplying contagion effects of 
displaced persons and lawlessness (Krasner & Pascual, 2005; National Security 
Strategy, 2010).  They bring down their neighbors, often making them more 
vulnerable to potential organized terror groups seeking a combination of 
ungoverned space and mission resources (Patrick, 2011).  The Failed State 
Index, now in its seventh year, is an attempt to understand the root causes of the 
failed state and “reverse engineer” a solution.  This popular reference is just one 
of many quantitative attempts to understand what happens when governments 
fail.  These states are caught in a cycle of violence, economic collapse and poor 
governance leaving the population more vulnerable to crime, disease and 
malnutrition (Haims et al., 2008; Toomey, 2006).  Without a functioning state the 
delicate balance of economy, rule of law and general security, are disrupted 
accelerating society‟s demise, allowing other nefarious organizations the 
opportunity to take hold where the government once stood.   
A. RECENT U.S. RECONSTRUCTION INVOLVEMENT 
Correcting the downward trend of failing states before complete collapse 
is a complex and not well understood challenge.  The U.S. has a long history of 
interventions attempting to remedy this problem, but recent reconstruction and 
stabilization performance has yielded mixed results.  In fact, the U.S. effort to 
stabilize and rebuild Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan and 
Iraq are all frequently characterized as inadequate (Buss, 2005, p. 1).  The 
planning for the stabilization and reconstruction effort following OPERATION 
Iraqi Freedom was flawed primarily because of the core assumptions made 
about the operating environment.  U.S. planners assumed after Saddam 
Hussein‟s regime fell there would be very few security issues to contend with, 
 2 
and the bulk of the Iraqi government civil servants would simply return to work 
(Bensahel, 2006, Collins, 2007).  Additionally, the U.S. failed to adequately react 
to the changing conditions in Iraq and the initial, and ultimately, insufficient 
stabilization plan took far too long to implement (Pirnie & O‟Connell, 2008).  
Another hard lesson the U.S. experienced firsthand in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
is that successful planning must also incorporate a unity of effort.  Buss (2005) 
argues that future reconstruction will only be effective if the State Department 
and Department of Defense align efforts through a “deliberate planning process” 
(p. 4).   
Ignoring local history is another flaw made in recent reconstruction efforts.  
The attempt made to establish a strong central government in Afghanistan failed 
miserably making it “barely distinguishable from the centralized monarchies and 
dictatorships that had characterized earlier regimes” (Barfield, 2010, p. 7).  The 
environment in Afghanistan had changed, and the reconstruction effort began 
with an unsound strategy attempting “to restore a system designed for autocrats 
in a land where autocracy was no longer politically sustainable” (Barfield, 2010, 
p. 7).  Without sufficient upfront planning, the end state goals will be difficult and 
potentially unobtainable to reach.  Another error made early on in the stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts was how aid was initially distributed and employed.  An 
effort was made to capitalize on the brief window of opportunity to build goodwill 
after formal kinetic military operations ended.  This effort during the “golden hour” 
included spending large amounts of money to help with emergency aid and initial 
reconstruction.  The root problem with these actions was the lack of planning.  
The sheer magnitude of the money spent had little oversight which resulted in 
corruption, poor quality and did little to encourage the population‟s trust in the 
system (Cordesman & Burke, 2011; Theros & Kaldor, 2011). 
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B. SUMMARIZED FINDINGS 
This report concentrates on the impact of construction on reducing 
violence, therefore increasing stability, in conflict-affected environments.  
Additionally this study tries to determine if the methodology or manager of the 
construction makes a significant impact on stability.  After comparing five 
separate databases with statistical regression and employing geospatial and 
temporal analysis, the result is construction projects have a statistically 
significant role in stability, and the method matters. 
The majority of U.S. led initiatives included a positive relationship between 
construction and violence.  This does not necessarily mean that Commander‟s 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) construction causes violence.  The 
program in Afghanistan is executed in areas of pre-existing higher violence per 
the philosophy of using money as a weapons system.  What this does indicate is 
that CERP construction has not reduced violence significantly.  Of all the 
programs studied the National Solidarity Program (NSP) has the most potential 
and promise.  The NSP analysis resulted in a negative trend compared to 
violence.  The NSP program also had a statistically significant impact reducing 
attacks targeting the state and NGOs.   
Unfortunately for the impact of construction on stability, while significant, 
much work was not executed in a manner that emphasizes the potential for 
betterment.  Maximizing this potential can be accomplished by striking the right 
balance between external international led development and internal local state 
development, creating clear programmatic goals and ensuring agencies 
engaging in construction for stabilization are better educated.  The impact of 
construction on stability can also be enhanced by understanding the impact of 
each element of a stabilization and reconstruction strategy, understanding the 
pitfalls associated with development and sequencing construction upfront 
showing the population early results.  Finally, there a statistically discernable 
difference between construction conducted by an outside organization and the 
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Community Driven Development in Afghanistan.  The vast majority of the NSP 
comparisons resulted in a statistically significant impact on violence.  The other 
programs studied have a positive relationship with violence or are not statistically 
significant. 
C. STRUCTURE 
The U.S. has now spent over a decade in Afghanistan in order to stabilize 
and reconstruct the government to create a potential ally.  In just the last six 
years the U.S. has spent over $2 billion through CERP alone in Afghanistan 
(Boak, 2011).  There is a growing debate about the effectiveness of this funding 
and its overall impact on stabilization.  In this work I will review the impact 
construction has had on the stabilization of Afghanistan using construction data 
generated by the U.S. CERP program, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the Afghanistan government itself through the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation Development (MRRD).  I will compare this 
information against the recorded Significant Acts (SIGACTs) by U.S., partner 
forces and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community to determine if 
there is any correlation and causation with reduced levels of violence at the 
village level.  This work is not specifically intended to develop a methodology to 
improve the ongoing stabilization and reconstruction intervention in Afghanistan.  
Instead, the goal of this study is to export some applicable lessons gained from 
working in this challenging environment. 
Chapter Two of this thesis is a review of current literature on nation-
building including accepted frameworks and reviews of recent nation-building 
efforts.  Chapter Three discusses the specific theoretical framework used in 
detail.  Additionally, Chapter Three includes the overall thesis methodology, 
comparing four different construction programs to determine their potential 
impact on state stability.  Chapter Four discusses the characteristics of the 
construction work being completed in Afghanistan and the studied organizations 
that are executing the work.  Chapter Five is a description of the data used in the 
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study, details of data refinement, analysis and study results.  Chapter Six 
contains recommendations and conclusions based on the study results. 
 6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
After major hostilities have ended following a civil war, or war between two 
states, conflict often continues.  This conflict manifests itself in many different 
ways including insurgencies, destabilization by spoilers and both organized and 
unorganized crime.  States trying to rebuild in these conflict-affected 
environments must include more than kinetic action alone.  The strategy to end 
this sustained and deep-seated conflict, including insurgencies, must draw upon 
reconstruction and stabilization methods.  Rebuilding a failed state is a massively 
complex undertaking, and many authors theorize there is an equally complicated 
answer.  A contemporary nation building strategy is rooted in attempting to 
replicate the pillars of a successful state in the failed state.  The pillars of society, 
when properly developed, underpin a functioning state. 
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Peacekeeping and 
Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) state these government attributes include:  
rule of law, building a safe and secure environment, creating social well-being, 
stable governance and sustainable economy (2009).  They also argue that no 
effort is complete without uniting individual state development programs through 
the “cross-cutting principles” of “Host Nation ownership and capacity, political 
primacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, and regional 
engagement” (USIP & PKSOI 2009, p. 2–9).  The guidance outlined is a very 
thorough compilation of best practices that can be used to customize a 
stabilization and reconstruction strategy.  Additionally, the USIP and PKSOI 
orient their guidance based on long-term goals or “end states” and develop their 
best practices working backwards from the goal.  Finally, the work includes some 
best practices on employing construction to increase stabilization but does not 
include guidance on what organizations are effective in implementing these 
programs. 
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While Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005) stop short of prescribing their 
sovereign state definition as a template for state reconstruction, the functions 
they identified certainly fit this model.  Ghani et al. (2005) argue the ten critical 
state functions are:  legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, 
administrative control, management of public finances, investment in human 
capital, delineation of citizenship rights and duties, provision of infrastructure 
services, formation of the market, management of the state‟s assets, 
international relations, and rule of law (p. 5).  Both frameworks for stable 
government omit any discussion of sequencing or prioritization.  Instead, they 
prescribe that each pillar have equal weight and that programs to build these 
state attributes must be implemented in unison.   
Meierhenrich (2004) argues that instead of trying to rebuild a host of state 
functions at once, the process should be sequenced concentrating on the 
development of “legality and bureaucracy” (p. 156).  This nuanced construct has 
a great deal of merit in describing the minimum needs for the development of a 
state.  The development of legality, or rule of law, allows for the creation of the 
social contract between the new state government and its people.  This contract 
will allow the citizens to understand the state goals, what services the state will 
provide and the citizen‟s requirements as a member of the state.  Development 
of state bureaucracy provides jobs for elites and other potential spoilers that 
might otherwise subvert the reconstruction process.  More importantly, these 
bureaucratic structures will be the foundation of the government‟s delivery of 
everything from infrastructure to security.  The state bureaucracy also provides 
other practical necessities as a process for external aid to be accepted and 
prioritized by the new state.  Meierhenrich (2004) concludes that state 
reconstruction must be centered on creating utility for its citizens to receive 
populous support for the new state, but does not specifically describe how to 
generate that utility (p.155).  Rebuilding a state after collapse is a lengthy 
process, and the fledgling state will be vulnerable to insurgency and other 
spoilers.  The state will not be able to “provide essential services to the 
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population” increasing the chance of “insurgency because the state‟s security 
forces … are unable to establish law and order” (Jones, 2008, pp. 16–17). 
While Meierhenrich‟s (2004) and Ghani et al. (2005) both have strong 
theoretical approaches to developing state capacity after conflict there is not 
enough detail within the publications for implementation.  Another approach 
currently being used as the reconstruction strategic foundation in Afghanistan is 
referred to as the “Comprehensive Approach.”  This effort to stabilize the state 
implemented by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in order “to 
improve on the current level of cooperation between security forces, other 
government activities, and the rest of the actors involved” (Stavridis, 2011, p. 66).  
This approach stresses the inclusion of all government activities and increasing 
its span of influence is not new to stabilization and reconstruction practitioners.  
Rather, the Comprehensive Approach emphasizes looking at the problem at 
many levels from the macro international influence to the micro level village and 
government relationships.  This framework aims to coordinate plans and align 
resources that “the local, national, and global communities have to offer” 
(Stavridis, 2011, p. 76).  
The ISAF Comprehensive Approach tries to employ both top-down and 
bottom-up development.  Part of the thrust is to overcome the unity of effort 
dilemma that faces complex conflict-affected reconstruction efforts.  Addressing 
these concerns by forcing NGOs, the host nation government, other aid 
organizations and international military forces to coordinate seems like a logical 
necessity.  In reality, this is extremely difficult and NGOs have resisted what they 
see as “politicization and militarization of aid” (Cornish & Glad, 2008, p.3).  This 
approach also creates other challenges including an untenable span of control 
and directing priorities of very diverse organizations.  Implementation of this 
strategy has also degraded security for NGOs operating within Afghanistan, 
blurring the line between ISAF and theoretically independent NGOs (Cornish & 
Glad, 2008, p.3).   
 10 
Kumar (1997) groups the reconstruction of war-stricken societies into 
three separate categories: political, social and economic rehabilitation.  The 
goals identified under political rehabilitation include institutional capacity for 
governance, support for elections, human rights monitoring and promotion, 
security reforms and demobilization and reintegration activities (Kumar, 1997).  
Identified in this framework as key elements of social rehabilitation are the 
repatriation and resettlement of refugees, reforming education and health 
services and social rehabilitation programs for women and children (Kumar, 
1997).  Finally, the third reconstruction category of economic rehabilitation 
contain the removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, reviving agriculture, 
rebuilding of physical infrastructure and implementing macroeconomic policy 
reform (Kumar, 1997). 
Finally, Timilsina (2006) is one of the few authors that prescribe a 
sequencing framework during reconstruction activities.  However, the 
recommended framework is less about sequencing and more a practical 
application of reconstruction activities given the physical state and capacity of the 
conflict-affected society.  Timilsia (2006) breaks down stabilization and 
reconstruction into three phases.  Phase one is characterized by basic security 
and emergency services, phase two develops legitimate and sustainable 
indigenous economy, governance and justice and phase three consolidates long-
term recovery efforts (p. 18). 
A. PILLARS OF RECONSTRUCTION  
What each of the authors use to describe their approach is an outline of 
principles for reconstruction typically called pillars.  The “Guiding principles for 
stabilization and reconstruction” by the USIP and PKSOI argue the end states of 
a society are:  a safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, 
sustainable economy and social well-being (2009).  As discussed, there are 
several other published reconstruction and stabilization frameworks, but this 
framework does the best job of describing the range of generally accepted 
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reconstruction pillars.  Using the USIP and PKSOI framework I will review these 
pillars individually.  The process and time required to develop each pillar will 
depend on the indigenous capacity of the society, and additional factors like 
resources provided and external influences.  It is as important to clearly 
understand and assess the progress of this development as it is to understand 
the goal.  Therefore, I also review associated measures of effectiveness that can 
be used to evaluate progress.  The goal of the following is to provide an overview 
of current literature on reconstruction pillars and their accompanying 
measurement.   
1. Security 
When states cannot provide basic security they “are unable to garner 
sufficient legitimacy to maintain citizen confidence and trust” (Brinkerhoff & 
Johnson, 2009, p. 587).  The USIP and PKSOI define a safe and secure 
environment by five conditions:  “cessation of large-scale violence,” “public 
order,” “legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence,” “physical 
security” and “territorial security” (USIP & PKSOI, 2009, pp. 38–39).  It is widely 
accepted that at least a minimum amount of security for the population must be 
established before reconstruction can begin (Stavridis, 2011; USIP & PKSOI, 
2009, p. 12).   
Short-term security goals involve an overarching end to active hostilities, 
separating warring parties and securing key sites and infrastructure (USIP & 
PKSOI, 2009, p. 37).  Without conflict resolution activities including disarmament 
demobilization and reintegration, fighting could quickly resume once the military 
intervention is over.  Long-term security goals must be centered on “freedom of 
movement” allowing “children to travel to school without fear of attack and 
farmers to take their goods to market” (USIP & PKSOI, 2009, p. 57).  Both 
quantity and quality is needed in comprehensive security sector reform as 
security forces will be government representatives to the population and must 
create trust (Timilsina, 2006, 134). 
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Progress must be measured “based on the mission‟s ability to reduce the 
means and motivations for violent conflict in a society” throughout the 
stabilization and reconstruction process (Cohen, 2006, p. 2).  Metrics that can be 
used to measure the effectiveness of security efforts include improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) reported compared to IEDs found, security 
transportation prices, progress of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
construction projects and urban construction new-start rates (Kilcullen, 2009).  
New population financed construction represents analysis of current and future 
personal security (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 8–9).  Other measures include SIGACTs, 
SIGACTs targeted at NGOs, and attacks targeting infrastructure as identified by 
the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) program (Agoglia et 
al., 2010, p. 2).   
2. Rule of Law 
“It is impossible to provide 100 percent security without development” in a 
conflict-affected society (Stavridis, 2011, p. 68).  The conditions that lead to the 
rule of law end state include:  “just legal frameworks,” “public order,” “cultural of 
lawfulness,” “accountability to the law,” and “access to justice” (USIP & PKSOI, 
2009, p.64).  Establishing public order and accountability to the law are 
necessary short term steps towards the end state.  Furthermore, creating “rule-
bound order” will help develop the very “essence of the relationship between 
citizens and a functioning state” (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 201).  Overhauling 
the justice system too quickly can result in public confusion and poor results.  
Meeting the long term goals of rule of law are better achieved through a 
comprehensive strategic approach that emphasizes a cultural lawfulness, access 
to justice and creation of just legal frameworks in considering cultural norms 
(USIP & PKSOI, 2009, pp. 94–95). 
Several promising metrics to measure rule of law development include 
citizen percentage that fear law enforcement agencies, percentage of prison 
population relative to overall population, percentage of legal cases where 
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witnesses recant testimony, and the number of known criminals that occupy key 
government positions (Agoglia et al., 2010, pp. 35–37).  Additionally, advanced 
insurgencies often develop shadow governments to mimic or replace the state in 
an effort to exert greater influence.  Another measure of rule of law reform in this 
case is the willingness of the population to submit to these shadow courts verses 
the designated state government courts (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 7). 
3. Stable Governance 
The benefits of good governance are numerous, and can help a rebuilding 
state better all other aspects of the recovery (Collier, 2007, p. 64).  The key 
objectives of governance are:  “essential services,” “stewardship of state 
resources,” “civic participation and empowerment” and “political moderation and 
accountability” (USIP & PKSOI, 2009, p. 97).  But liberal governance instituted 
before it is institutionalized “can unleash societal demands…thus triggering 
instability and conflict” (Barnett, 2006, p. 89).  So in the short term, the state 
effort should focus on providing services, transparent and participatory 
representation and protection of state resources.  These actions should build 
towards the ultimate goal of a relationship between “the government and its 
people whereby the government provides transparency, safety and security, 
economic opportunity, goods and services, and the population, in return, gives up 
some of its liberties and freedoms” (Gregg, 2009, p. 29).   
Qualitative population surveys that ask questions related to public 
satisfaction with essential services, transparency, legitimacy and corruption could 
indicate perception of government effectiveness (Agoglia et al., 2010, pp. 18–26).  
Quantitative measures of governance reforms include law revision that is 
applicable to continuation of the government incumbents, distribution of 
government services based on identity groups or adherence to government 




of governance reform and control is taxation.  The state exhibits high capacity 
and control when it can collect income taxes from the population (Weller & 
Ziegler, 2008, p. 16). 
4. Sustainable Economy 
The fourth end state identified by the USIP and PKSOI is achieving a 
sustainable economy.  A sustainable economy is defined as the “ability of the 
people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic 
governance bound by law” (USIP & PKSOI, 2009, p. 132).  A legal sustainable 
economy has many benefits including providing jobs for the population, 
improving the standard of living, expanding overall opportunity, creating tax 
revenue and reducing the potential for supporting insurgent groups (Gregg, 
2009).  The short term goals of developing the economy should be quick 
employment generation, provision of basic services, stabilizing inflation and open 
market promotion and transparency while controlling the black market economy 
(USIP & PKSOI, 2009, pp. 132–4).  The long term goal for building a sustainable 
economy should be a “legitimate and sustainable gross domestic product (GDP), 
which allows for the employment of its population, and an import/export economy 
that does not result in deficit spending” (Gregg, 2009, p. 27). 
Tracking economic growth is likely the most familiar types of measures 
used for peaceful and conflict economies alike.  The status state economies are 
measured in various ways including quantitative measures like growth in GDP 
and qualitative measures of consumer confidence.  Several other measures are 
needed to understand struggling state economy in a conflict-affected 
environment.  The majority of these measures are quantitative including 
functioning essential services compared to pre-war levels, amount of state 
generated revenue compared to external financial subsidies and the number of 
registered businesses (Agoglia et al., 2010, pp. 53–64).  Other helpful measures 
of the economy include estimating black market revenue, tracking the 
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immigration and departure of educated professionals and public satisfaction with 
service delivery (Agoglia et al., 2010, pp. 53–64).   
5. Social Well-Being 
Social well-being, the final pillar identified by the USIP and PKSOI (2009), 
is defined as the “ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to 
coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement” (p.162).  
The failing state results in social collapse and the breakdown of social trust 
throughout society (Sachs, 2000, p. 35).  Offering programs that reinforce social 
well being, that include social regulation and integration, will give great utility to 
the state (Meierhenrich, 2004, p. 156).  “The State must organize specific, 
demonstrable initiatives to regenerate social cohesion through policies and 
programmes that promote participation, equity and inclusion” (Ernstorfer et al., 
2007, p. 5).  Humanitarian relief concerns such as resettlement of returning 
displaced persons, supply of basic health services, and providing needed food, 
water and shelter must be addressed immediately (Timilsina, 2006, p. 138).  The 
longer term goals must include access to education, social reconciliation and 
further the social aspects of community and national identity (Cohen, 2006, p. 9). 
Measures of the infant mortality rate, school enrollment or literacy rates 
are good ways of measuring the social well-being beyond population surveys 
(Agoglia et al., 2010, pp. 69–77).  Tracking voluntarily returning refugees is also 
an indicator that the people feel the situation is stabilizing (Agoglia et al., 2010, p. 
70).  Finally, measuring the process of conflict reconciliation helps track the 
social well-being within the state through:  number of hate crimes, violence to 
achieve sociopolitical goals, and even surveying the availability for the population 
to participate in reconciliation events (Agoglia et al., 2010, pp. 69–77).  
6. Civil Society   
An end state that is not directly identified by the USIP and PKSOI (2009) 
is the concept of a civil society.  A civil society functions properly when social 
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capital, the set of rules and norms that holds societies together is high (Gregg, 
2009, p. 33).  By increasing social capital, a robust civil society can generate 
organizations that “compensate for the lack of state-provided public services” 
(Posner, 2004, p. 237).  The benefits of creating a robust civil society include 
“improving governmental performance…promoting good health, reducing crime, 
and generating economic growth” (Posner, 2004, p. 237).  Historically, social 
capital is not constructed through a conscious effort; instead it develops 
differently in every society (Gregg, 2009, p. 33).  Social capital is a natural 
byproduct of society, but in a conflict-affected environment, people withdraw from 
public situations.  Therefore, constructing a civil society with social capital must 
put the population in situations where they can interact in safe environments to 
build trust and interdependence (Gregg, 2009, p. 33).  Building social capital 
within the society should be targeted as a short and long term goal for a 
developing state. 
Measuring the developing civil society can be difficult but is still very 
important to capitalize on the numerous benefits strong social capital can 
provide.  Surveys are an important tool for quantifying trust.  Surveys should be 
frequently conducted with questions that cover participation in civic groups, 
degree of community trust, within group solidarity, and even opinion about 
minority and marginalized groups (Agoglia et al., 2010, p. 76).  Measures that 
look at the number, resources, and publicity of civil society organizations can 
also help determine trust among the population (Agoglia et al., 2010, p. 29).  A 
final social capital measure is tracking participation in social organizations that 
cross group identities (Agoglia et al., 2010, p. 76). 
7. Summary 
An argument can be made that each of the pillars discussed are important 
and critical in some measure to the overall success of the state.  It is generally 
agreed that security is a necessary condition before other pillars can be 
effectively implemented (Gregg (2009), Stavridis (2011)).  But, in conflict-affected 
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environments, work to develop capacity in the other pillars or end states cannot 
wait.  The resolution of violence is often tied directly to factors that can be 
addressed by working towards the other pillars including better rule of law, 
governance, and creating economic opportunities.  In this way each program 
used by the state or international force must maximize each pillar for the greatest 
effectiveness.  By identifying the end states up front the goal is more directly in 
mind, and better measures of effectiveness can be developed and implemented.  
It is critical for the state to keep meaningful and accurate records to determine 
progress in order to evaluate the program‟s effectiveness towards stabilization.  
B. RECENT STUDIES OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Several recent attempts were made to quantify the variety of benefits 
construction, training, job generation, and other stabilization methods targeted 
under the CERP program.  Gorkowski (2009) argued projects should be 
prioritized based on the population‟s needs and a deserve component that 
evaluates a local village‟s actions towards the state.  Gorkowski (2009) 
hypothesized construction can counter an insurgency by first maximizing needs 
and deserves of each project, and then increasing the publicity a project 
receives.  However, the CERP construction funding in the At Tameem province 
in Iraq did not reduce violence.  The problem most likely is not Gorkowski‟s 
(2009) model but that the projects reviewed did not use the model in their 
implementation.  In a similar effort, Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2009) found a 
positive correlation between construction projects and reduced levels of violence 
in Iraq.  Their encouraging conclusions included data from across Iraq, but did 
not provide a local level implementation guide.  O‟Connell (2008) completed a 
similar regression analysis from Afghanistan construction and violence data at 
the provincial level.  He found an increase in violence related to construction.  
This work did not suggest any specific reason for the positive correlation; thus 
more study is needed to resolve the conflict between these findings and 
Gorkowski (2009) and Berman et al. (2009).   
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Beath et al. (2010) completed a recent review of the NSP ongoing in 
Afghanistan.  The study compared the impact of the NSP on local governance, 
access to utilities and services, social cohesion and political attitudes and 
economic activity generated at the village level.  Using a group of both control 
and experiment villages the study found that the NSP was “successful in 
improving villagers‟ perceptions of their economic situation and of government 
representatives and officials and some nongovernmental actors” (Beath, et al., 
2010, p. vii).  Unfortunately, Beath et al. (2010) found no decrease in violence 
affecting the NSP villages or decrease in tribal feuds. 
C. VOID IN EXISTING LITERATURE 
Recent advances in reconstruction literature have begun to explore the 
challenges generated in a conflicted-affected environment.  However, the vast 
majority of the literature still focuses on stabilization and reconstruction in the 
post-conflict environment.  Recent history has shown that post-conflict 
reconstruction is often a luxury that is not practical with competing political 
priorities and budgetary constraints.  Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2009) and 
Gorkowski (2009) both reviewed stabilization activities in Iraq at the provincial 
and village level respectively, but their results conflict on the impact of CERP in 
reducing violence.  Two additional authors looked at stabilization activities in the 
conflict-affected environment of Afghanistan.  Both O‟Connell (2008), at the 
provincial level, and Beath et al. (2010) reviewing the village level, found that the 
stabilization and reconstruction techniques reviewed did not decrease violence.   
What has yet to be studied are the specific elements under stabilization 
and reconstruction activities for their individual impact.  By isolating specific 
elements of the CERP program or other stabilization and reconstruction 
initiatives it will be possible to determine if any specific activity results in the 
reduction of violence and increased stabilization.  Additionally, the unit of 
measure is an important factor in determining the impact of stabilization and 
reconstruction activities.  The previous studies discussed looked at both the 
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village and provincial levels.  While there is some merit to this analysis, reviewing 
the data at the district level in Afghanistan also has great potential.  Developing 
aggregate totals for a region can be difficult due to the spillover effect when 
reviewing impact at the village level.  The borders drawn on a map are often 
arbitrary, and increasing the number of divisions in the information exposes the 
study to greater error.  A successful stabilization program at the village level 
could result in no decrease in violence due to outside forces.  Additionally, the 
vast diversity in any country, including Afghanistan, makes a provincial study less 
likely to show the true impact of stabilization efforts by averaging out the highs 
and lows ignoring potentially vast societal differences. 
This study will focus on the role construction plays in reconstructing and 
stabilizing a state.  Most authors classify construction as a part of a larger effort 
to jump start the economy of a conflict-affected state.  Focusing my efforts within 
this pillar helps fill the existing literature void in two different ways.  First, the unit 
of study will primarily be conducted at the district level.  This should help address 
both issues discussed, and better account for spillover effects using small 
enough units to reflect the true nature of population.  Second, this study will 
review the impact of four stabilization and reconstruction programs implemented 
by three different organizations.  This is an attempt to determine if different 
organizations with different implementing techniques will have any difference in 
results.  Specifically, are there tangible benefits of having an international force, 
host nation personnel or military units manage and implement the stabilization 
effort?  Does the background, training, or perceived role have a noticeable 
impact on the results? 
Finally, instead of looking at CERP or the other stabilization programs as a 
whole, I will be reviewing the specific impact of construction as an individual 
component of reconstruction.  During my literature review, I found no individual 
studies that isolated a specific activity to determine the potential impact.  
Focusing on construction could show that we need to better understand the 
effectiveness of each of the activities under the reconstruction and stabilization 
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umbrella.  Developing and identifying the minimum effort required to achieve 
impact is very important for efficiency and effectiveness.  Something that is 
minimal investment in time also allows for better emphasis and quicker results.  
Furthermore, this process will help future policy makers customize and prioritize 
a construction program to best meet the needs of a future situation. 
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The state in a conflict-affected environment is placed in a precarious 
position.  The state must defeat any active opposition while simultaneously 
attempting to increase state administrative, police and military capacity.  If the 
opposition is insurgent in nature, attempting to separate the insurgency from the 
population can result in alienating state supporters and creating greater 
opposition.  When the state is weakened to the point where it cannot provide 
protection for its population, external support through military intervention may be 
the only way to reestablish state control.  The goal in this situation is to 
adequately defeat the insurgent forces and to develop overall state capacity.  
The problem is that a state government is removed from the equation when it 
cannot provide services to its population who are in desperate need.  Therefore, 
the social contract between the population and government does not exist 
resulting in the state becoming dispensable in the eyes of the population.  The 
best way to correct this may be through developing social capital, emphasizing 
program benefits and generating ownership in the process.  The goal of 
economic stabilization practices in a conflict-affected environment should be to 
create a self-sustaining economy but more importantly the process should link 
government and people.  The remainder of this section explores these ideas in 
greater detail.  
A. STATE LEGITIMACY AND SERVICE PROVISION   
Legitimacy links the population to the state.  The USIP and PKSOI (2009) 
argue that state legitimacy is composed of how accepting the population and 
international community is of the state and the state accountability to the 
population.  A failed state that cannot provide basic services to their population 
breaks the previously established social contract causing a loss of legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009; Ernstorfer, et al., 2007).  
These basic services include provision of water, food, security and potential 
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prosperity.  Many authors argue state legitimacy is directly tied to the provision of 
basic services for the population (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Hilhorst, Christoplos & Van 
Der Haar, 2010; Posner, 2004; Timilsina, 2006; USIP & PKSOI, 2009).  Without 
legitimacy a state will not be able to influence and control their population without 
resorting to the threat of or use of force.  Insurgent groups can actually gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population by providing basic services filling the void 
left by the state.  Without legitimacy the unstable state is prone to violence 
(Barnett, 2006).  Improving this situation theoretically can be accomplished by 
reversing the causation.  If the loss in state legitimacy is caused by its inability to 
provide services to the population, the state can gain legitimacy from the 
population through help in providing services.   
Services need to be resumed as soon as possible after major hostilities 
have ceased to erode enemy support and gain legitimacy from the population 
(Toomey, 2006, p. 20).  When a state cannot provide services it is placed in a 
desperate situation.  With very little capacity to supply services the state typically 
requests and accepts help from an outside state or group.  The third party 
provider, typically a foreign military or NGO which supplies these services, will 
gain the legitimacy and authority from the population (Haims et al., 2008, p. 24).  
This additional layer of bureaucracy places the state further away from gaining 
population support and undermines state legitimacy.  Providing goods and 
services through a third party increases the likelihood of corruption which further 
reduces state legitimacy (Grymes, 2003). 
B. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT 
In a conflict for control of the state, both the incumbent and the insurgent 
force fight over control of the people‟s behavior to gain resources in an effort to 
defeat the rival.  The population must weigh the costs and benefits of supporting 
the state in a counterinsurgency effort, supporting the insurgency or remaining 
neutral.  Costs and benefits can be either be immediately available to the general 
public or contingent upon their support.  If a benefit is provided as a common 
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good, such as roads used to take crops to market, the individual does not have to 
join either group to receive this benefit.  A private benefit, also referred to as a 
“selective incentive,” is one that is only received under certain conditions such as 
protection, as an insurgency member, from state raids (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007, 
p. 180).  An entire village raided in the middle of the night is a publicly shared 
cost for all villagers, but a night letter delivered to a person‟s doorstep is typically 
a direct threat to the individual.   
The population weighs both public and private costs and benefits, but also 
assesses the probability of receiving those costs and benefits (McCormick & 
Giordano, 2007, p. 296).  If the state threatens to inflict a high cost to any person 
helping the insurgency, but no villagers have ever seen any state agents, the 
probability of incurring this cost is very low.  Therefore, the value of this cost is 
very low and is not given much weight.  If the state has a group of police 
constantly patrolling the streets, the probability of incurring this cost is high and, 
therefore, the value of patrolling is also high. 
Increasing selective incentives, or excludable benefits, is one way the 
state can gain support from the population.  Nonexcludable costs and benefits do 
not play into the decision calculus because the population receives each 
regardless of participation.  Members of the population will find it irrational to 
spend personal resources on something that is gained for no additional effort 
(Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 289).  Additionally, individual preferences play into 
the population‟s choice.  Many people are likely to accept fewer benefits and 
greater costs when necessary to support their preferred side (Mason, 1996, p. 
72).  This concept is also linked closely with the importance of the state being 
seen as legitimate in the eyes of the population as the sole provider of these 
benefits.   
C. GROWING CIVIL SOCIETY  
Public support is needed for the state to develop successfully in a conflict-
affected environment.  Growing this support can be achieved by building social 
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capital within the society.  Fukuyama (2000) defines social capital as “an 
instantiated set of informal rules or norms shared among members of a group 
that permits them to cooperate with one another” (p. 98).  When state capacity to 
provide services is low, a substitute method is required.  By increasing social 
capital, a robust civil society can generate organizations that “compensate for the 
lack of state-provided public services” (Posner, 2004, p. 237).  The benefits of 
creating a robust civil society include “improving governmental 
performance…promoting good health, reducing crime, and generating economic 
growth” (Posner, 2004, p. 237).   
Unfortunately, civil society is typically weakest following a state failure 
because people withdraw from a society that lacks basic governance, security 
and rule of law (Posner, 2004, p. 247).  Normally, a significant amount of trust is 
required to build civil capital in a community.  A robust civil society can serve as a 
stop gap measure to fill the void left by the absent state to provide basic services.  
However, there must be a driving force making people supplement or totally 
replace a functioning state.  Organizers face a classic collective action problem 
trying to mobilize people to act when a person determines that the same benefit 
is gained for no additional effort (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 289).  Furthermore, 
overcoming the collective action problem becomes more difficult as the size of 
the group increases (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 109).  Posner (2004) argues the best 
solution to the collective action problem is providing a form of payment to the 
people for their participation in service delivery (p. 243).  This solution is only 
temporary, and unless civil society is adequately developed, when the funding 
goes away so too will the volunteers.   
D. OWNERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION 
Participation in the reconstruction process is well documented by 
academics to generate long term success for the implemented program 
(Condrey, 2010; Orr, 2002; UN Evaluation Office, 2009).  Making the process 
inclusive gives people the opportunity to have their voices heard and can serve 
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as a “platform for dialogue” to address other social issues pertinent to the conflict 
(Fripp, 2006, p. 12).  Encouraging participation and ownership will also give the 
local population a strong incentive to maintain their investment.  The investment 
of time, money, supplies or social capital will shape future decisions to ensure 
the investment is not lost (Toomey, 2006, p. 20).  Protecting the investment could 
include physical maintenance, vandalism protection or protection against 
insurgent sabotage.  Participation in reconstruction provides significant social 
benefits to the community and process including: “(a) instilling dignity; (b) 
mobilizing (sic) people as problem solvers in their own social environments; (c) 
facilitating access to higher arenas of decision making” (Brown, 2005, p. 762). 
Community participation can help identify the real needs of the community 
because participation itself is an indicator of the value of the project to the 
community (Weggeland, 2011, p. 21).  Project ownership can have additional 
impacts beyond supporting individual project completion.  Community ownership 
can create stronger local institutions, develop civic capacity and improve social 
relations leading towards increased state legitimacy (Barron, 2011; Davids, 
Rietjens & Soeters, 2010).  Widespread involvement will also help decrease the 
potential for spoilers and, if done in a transparent fashion, will help reduce the 
potential for groups channeling funding away from its intended purpose (Orr, 
2002).  Tracking participation rates can also be used as a good gauge of popular 
support for the sponsoring organization.  If people are willing to openly participate 
in a reconstruction activity in a conflict-affected environment, they most likely 
think the organization and process has legitimacy (Kilculin, 2009, p. 8). 
E. RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTION  
The conflict-affected environment provides significant challenges to 
economic recovery. Construction is one part of a larger process to rebuild a 
conflict-affected nation-state.  The development of the existing economy hinges 
on the construction of the physical infrastructure to provide building blocks of 
stabilization.  The quantifiable benefits of construction are easily cited including 
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creating jobs, better physical access to markets, infrastructure development and 
health improvement (USIP & PKSOI, 2009, p. 9–151).  The more qualitative and 
potentially less tangible benefits include potential for construction activities to 
reduce insurgent violence utilizing techniques discussed in the previous section.  
However, reconstruction and stabilization of a nation-state is an extremely 
complicated process.  Planning construction to achieve both immediate physical 
and strategic benefits is often either overlooked, poorly implemented, or both.  
The limited literature on the effect of construction activities typically focuses on 
overarching policy, but it does not offer a model for local implementation.  Any 
successful model for construction in this environment must be viable at the 
lowest level. 
Making the economy the primary focus of state reconstruction helps solve 
collective action and legitimacy problems while increasing social capital when the 
state provides basic services.  First, developing the economy is central to the 
state achieving success in the key functions as defined by Ghani et al. (2005).  
Several of the core state functions directly attributed to economic development 
include management of public finances, formation of the market and 
management of the state‟s assets.  Second, a huge advantage of focusing on the 
economy is that the population sees progress and development and the potential 
state utility.  The specific projects targeted can bring goods and services to both 
population centers and rural areas.  Third, the provision of infrastructure services 
as part of economic development brings the country together.  “Reliable 
infrastructure ensures the essential predictability required for participation by a 
state and its citizens in information networks and in a global economy that 
depends on just-in-time production and distribution” (Ghani et al., 2005, p. 7).  
Meierhenrich (2003) concurred stating that developing “transportation is critical to 
reducing the distance between the core and the periphery…. and geographical 
linkage is key to sustaining fledgling states” (p. 161).  Fourth, a state that is able 
to raise money can fund an army to protect its borders and provide legitimate 
monopoly on the means of violence.  Fifth, trade is interrelated with developing 
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diplomatic relations with neighboring states and the international community.  
Finally, investing in the population through economic development contributes to 
human capital making citizens active actors in society (Ghani et al., 2005, p. 6). 
Employing the local population to work on projects in the area surrounding 
their community creates greater ties with civil society and ownership.  The 
connection a person feels to civil society “often contributes critically to his 
personal economic performance” (Kuran, 2004, p. 119).  Also, employing local 
workers generates social capital because they will learn by working as a 
community and needs are satisfied “more effectively” (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 105).  
As civil society develops, the community has a stake in protecting their physical 
investment leading to greater rule of law.  Community projects create “a critical 
mass of group members” that “derive a benefit from participation that is 
independent of the public good that the group is designed to generate” (Posner, 
2004, p. 243).  These groups are better equipped to supplement state services 
without undermining legitimacy or state utility. 
Targeting the economy also is helpful in developing worker trade 
associations.  These groups often act as advocates or watchdogs to ensure the 
state is properly developing workers rights and market regulation (Posner, 2004).  
These associations help “provide a thousand reminders to each citizen that he 
lives in society” (De Tocqueville, 2003, p. 595).  Creating groups around trade 
and labor unions will result in other civil associations, greater social capital and 
eventually “pave the way for political associations” (De Tocqueville, 2003, p. 
604). 
Using construction as the tool to meet these goals is a great way to 
combine multiple benefits in one program.  Building a road betters security 
through easier patrols, extends the rule of law and provides an influx of money 
contributing to the economy.  Locally run projects funded through the host nation 
create jobs building state legitimacy as the government implements services, 
social capital and helps develop social well-being.  This effect was discussed by 
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Pirnie and O‟Connell (2008), who argue that when construction employed the 
local population there was increased support for the government. 
Additionally, there is strong evidence to support that what is needed for 
stabilization is better economic policies.  Bueno de Mesquita and Root (2000) 
advocate the creation of free market economies to drive good governance.  
Reinforcing their point, Persson and Tabellini (2006) state that stable government 
increased economic growth more than the change to democracy.  By beginning 
the reform around existing local political communities, Ellis and Sisco (2010) 
believe that increased stability and legitimacy derive from reinforcing existing 
local governance structures.  Brinkerhoff and Johnson (2009) agree with this 
approach adding decentralized local governance increases service delivery 
speed while avoiding „winner takes all‟ politics. 
1. Community Driven Development 
One way to employ the techniques and best practices discussed is using 
Community Driven Development (CDD) or Community Driven Reconstruction 
(CDR).  CDD is the latest in a long line of approaches used by the UN to solve 
problems that have traditionally hindered their development work.  A typical CDD 
program requires members of the community to band together to select, lobby for 
funding, contribute equity, manage and construct projects to better their 
individual villages.  These groups are often initially given technical construction 
and management support where needed by NGOs or other aid organizations.  
The strength of a CDD approach is the potential combination of “governance, 
humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and reconciliation” under one program 
forcing divided societies to work together to succeed in creating unity and trust 
(USIP & PKSOI, 2009, p. 10–191).  The CDD approach allows local people to 
identify their needs and help themselves.  Making a group commitment towards a 
construction project demonstrates and increases trust within the community 
(McKechnie, 2003, p. 8).  Execution of the project helps generate both ownership 
and social capital.  A study performed by Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 
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(2009) showed that communities that had a CDD program also had increased 
social capital in post-conflict Liberia (p. 288).  The increased social capital also 
has the potential to harden the community against insurgent activity.  The 
insurgent group can undermine local support by attacking a project where the 
community has invested time, labor and materials (Patterson & Robinson, 2011, 
p. 119).  CDD projects develop ownership that can cause the community to 
“defend, maintain, and expand the project after donor organizations have left” 
(DOA, 2008, p. C-2). 
Another benefit of the CDD approach tackles the difficult challenge of 
absorptive capacity of the state.  The conflict-affected state is often unable to 
convert large amounts of financial assistance into contracted construction 
projects.  CDD increases the absorptive capacity of the state by stimulating the 
demand through small manageable projects.  This is done by creating jobs, 
growing state administrative support and energizing the supply chain for goods 
and services (Bannon et al., 2004, p. 27).  Using construction as the conduit for 
local government reform helps manage the population‟s expectations for service 
delivery and makes them a state collaborator in the process (Galtung & Tisné, 
2009, p. 107). 
CDD programs can also serve as the focal point for external assistance 
provided to the conflict-affected state.  Large scale development programs often 
have several agencies providing assistance leading to overlapping and 
uncoordinated programs.  Community driven programs can better assess what is 
needed by creating a master needs assessment for outside organizations 
resulting in better overall unity of effort (Bannon et al., 2004, p. 24).  This switch 
also changes the dynamic of the relationship between the people and aid 
providers.  Ownership of the master list gives the local CDD council more control 
over the reconstruction process creating a better sense of stability in an 
otherwise unstable situation.  The CDD can serve as “public private partnership” 
that creates the ability to quickly and cheaply fund service provisions 
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(McKechnie, 2003, p. 8).  World Bank field experience has highlighted that the 
CDD process is more cost efficient than other rural development methods 
(Bannon et al., 2004, p. 30). 
2. Potential Risks Associated with Construction 
Rebuilding state capacity and legitimacy through construction has 
potential risks that must be mitigated.  First, the fragile or failed state typically will 
not have the resources to fund nationwide economic development programs.  
Generous financial donors or significant loans from the World Bank and technical 
knowledge are required for large scale development.  Additionally, there is an 
ongoing academic debate that aspects of a country‟s diverse culture will suffer by 
adopting liberalized economic practices.  Multicultural proponents claim that the 
spread of globalization destroys “local cultures, harms the affected communities” 
and “even humanity as a whole” (Kuran, 2004, p. 115).  The programs that 
conflict with local culture may be unsustainable over the period of time required 
to be effective.  If the construction process or project conflicts with local culture 
the “reconstruction efforts are likely to fail, incentivize corruption, and weaken the 
legitimacy of the … government” (Malan, 2010, p. V).  Supporters of globalization 
claim that change happens in all cultures, “and in periods of economic transition, 
it inevitably accelerates” (Kuran, 2004, p. 115).  Economic development does not 
have to change a culture to be effective.  A smartly crafted plan will incorporate 
the strengths of the culture into economic development such as selling traditional 
rugs or exporting indigenous produce.  There are however certain cultural 
practices that can significantly hinder economic development.  Culture will harm 
development if specific groups of people are discriminated against by “class, 
cast, ethnicity, religion, or gender” (Sachs, 2006, p. 87).  Balancing these 
traditional customs and local beliefs with a developing economy may be 
extremely challenging. 
Another barrier to economic development could include the introduction of 
technology.  Using a simple hand pump to irrigate a field may be time consuming 
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and labor intensive, but a new automated system could quickly breakdown 
without proper training or maintenance.  A failing state will also have to overcome 
a potential loss of intellectual capital to develop the economy and rebuild.  The 
more educated, upwardly mobile section of the population may choose to escape 
the chaotic situation and not return.  Since ideas generate other ideas, the lack of 
internally generated technological advancement leaves a state struggling to keep 
pace with modernization (Sachs, 2000, p. 30).  The international aid received by 
a state can even hinder economic performance.  Donor programs have the 
tendency to create parallel structures without harmonization or aid predictability 
therefore undermining state legitimacy (Ghani et al., 2005, p. 9).  A country‟s 
geography can also hinder economic development when land locked and located 
in a tropical region without significant natural resources (Sachs, 2000, p. 30).   
Economic aid can also generate corruption.  Pervasive corruption in a 
state struggling to rebuild can undermine support for the government, damage 
social capital, and hinder economic growth (Jones, 2008, pp. 16–17).  Corruption 
is common when a massive amount of aid is given to a rebuilding state that may 
not have the means to absorb the funding (Baliamoune-Lutz & McGillivray, 2008, 
p. 1; Stavridis, 2011, p. 74).  Corruption is usually exacerbated by the pressure to 
commit money quickly without the right oversight and audit mechanisms in place 
(Theros & Kaldor, 2011, p. 25).  Before aid is committed, donating agencies must 
consider the capacity of the economy, capability of local workers, and available 
bureaucratic structures (Cross, 2010).  Considering these factors and aligning 
smaller projects with the local capability to meet the immediate need will help 
overcome these issues. 
Capture is also a potential problem with construction activities in conflict-
affected environments.  Capture occurs when special groups “seize the benefits” 
generated by the construction funding, contracts, material supply or the labor 
used (McNab & Mason, 2007, p. 368).  These special groups can be divided 
along religious, class, ethnic or other social divisions.  Existing societal 
fragmentation can often intensify if projects are not allocated in a fair and 
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transparent manner.  Capture can negate the benefits of the construction 
activities; diverting public goods and services, and therefore subverting state 
legitimacy. 
A construction program must constantly balance the amount of autonomy 
given to the host nation.  International contracting companies can be contracted 
to construct the needed work in any conflict-affected environment.  This, 
however, is typically done at a much greater cost compared to using local 
companies and workers.  Using international workers provides fewer jobs and 
training for the host nation population.  However, large scale or complicated 
projects might demand a level of expertise that is not available locally.  Projects 
that are highly technical and seen as critical, for example a hydroelectric dam, 
are better completed by a competent organization with trained and experienced 
staff.  Smaller scale projects with more flexible timelines afford the opportunity to 
develop host nation capacity while building the local economy (USIP & PKSOI, 
2009). 
Finally, the sustainability of a project is a major issue when implementing 
a construction program in a failing or failed state.  Programs that do not focus on 
developing local capacity and invest in human capital create a dependency on 
the aid “reducing the chances for sustainability and squandering opportunities for 
nascent governments to establish their legitimacy” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 7).  
Sustainability can also be a problem with the project itself.  The ability to sustain 
a project is significantly reduced when projects are constructed without local 
techniques or when a required supply chain for maintenance parts is unavailable. 
These factors can be difficult to overcome, but there are several things 
that can be done to jumpstart economic development.  First, education has 
numerous benefits and will specifically help the economy through the inclusion of 
new ideas for innovation and the generation of entrepreneurs.  “Without higher 
education geared towards producing responsible citizenship and marketable 
skills in the economy, neither administrative reform nor competitiveness can be 
realistic goals” (Ghani et al., 2005, p. 7).  Second, the economy-focused state 
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should create a free marketplace without social or class restrictions.  Eliminating 
individual restrictions allows a greater and more diverse population into the work 
force, and has the potential to increase the overall intellectual capital.  Finally, the 
inclusion of the right technology allows countries to create more products with 
“increasing returns to scale” (Sachs, 2000, p. 39). 
F. ARGUMENT 
I argue that by maximizing the elements of social capital, state legitimacy, 
participation and ownership and providing exclusive benefits when implementing 
a construction program should theoretically generate greater stability.  When 
construction is executed in a conflict-affected environment, specifically in a 
contest between an insurgent group and state, I hypothesize the opposite is also 
true.  If the state does not maximize these parameters it can actually decrease 
stabilization.  This hypothesis can be represented by the functional relationship: 
  , , ,S f SC L P E  (1) 
S = Stability   
SC = Social Capital 
L = Legitimacy  
P = Participation and Ownership 
E = Exclusive Benefits 
Stability is designated as the Dependent Variable (DV) for this analysis.  
There are many different theoretical measures of societal stability.  The Failed 
States Index developed by the Fund for Peace uses twelve indicators from 
mounting demographic pressures to progressive deterioration of public services 
to approximate stability (Fund For Peace, 2011).  There are several other similar 
indexes that use survey data and expert opinion to approximate state stability.  
These can be useful tools for long term, state-wide trends but do not yield any 
granularity on specific regions or specific affect on stability within the country.  
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Other approaches to estimating stability include participation rate in 
reconstruction programs, taxation rate, and progress of NGO construction 
projects (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 8–9).  The potential theoretical value of these 
measures is great but the data to measure these programs is extremely limited, 
flawed or unavailable.  SIGACTs or incident counts are a record of where and 
when violence occurred.  Using SIGACTs as a stability indicator has advantages 
and disadvantages.  Some of the largest advantages are, as a general trend, a 
reduction in violence is needed for greater stability, and low violence is both a 
short and long term goal.  Other benefits of using SIGACTs are the availability 
and accuracy of the data.  The period of recorded data is generally better and 
more robust compared to other tracked metrics.  However, SIGACTs as a 
measure can also be misleading.  The report of violence will partially depend on 
the individual or group making the report.  Additionally, areas with low violence 
does not indicate the state has control (Kilculin, 2009, p. 7).  Using recorded 
violent acts against NGOs to describe area stability helps mitigate some of these 
concerns.  NGOs should be more able to complete their construction projects 
with limited interruption when the state is in control.  I have chosen to utilize 
SIGACTS from the WITS database and the USAID NGO violence database to 
approximate stability.  Both databases will be described in greater detail below in 
the data section.   
In order to determine if construction has any effect on stability, completed 
construction projects are used as my Independent Variable (IV).  The completed 
construction will represent the development of the four parameters discussed 
above: social capital, link to state legitimacy, participation and ownership, and 
exclusive benefits.  The greater the construction programs maximize these 
parameters, I hypothesize the greater impact on stability the program will have by 
reducing violence.  This project will compare four different construction programs 
executed by different agencies and governments to determine their potential 
impact on Afghan stability.  Described in greater detail in the next section, these 
programs are CERP-related construction by regular army units, CERP executed 
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by PRTs, construction executed by NGOs through USAID and the NSP 
sponsored by the Afghan government.  
I hypothesize that increased ownership and community investment by the 
local population will decrease measured violence.  Further, I argue that 
constructing wanted, locally sustainable projects also increases stability, i.e., 
decreasing measured violence.  I will use a combination of statistical regression 
and temporal analysis to compare completed projects with recorded SIGACTs 
reported by U.S. forces and NGOs.  This can be represented by the following 
equations:   
  DV IV   (2) 
DV = Dependent Variable  
IV = Independent Variable 
  1SA f C     (3) 
SA = SIGACTs 
β1 = Unknown Coefficient  
C = Completed Construction Methodology 
ε = Error term 
The state must exploit all available benefits from stabilization and 
reconstruction programs in order to increase efficiency of effort to defeat an 
insurgency.  Emphasizing social capital, process ownership, and exclusive costs 
and benefits through service provision should help create the bond between state 
and population.  Until this bond is created the state will not be able to effectively 
defeat an insurgency increasing the overall costs of the effort. 
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IV. AFGHANISTAN CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM OVERVIEW  
The war in Afghanistan is now the longest conflict in U.S. history.  The 
U.S. has employed several different construction implementing strategies in 
order to stabilize and support the Afghan government.  Practically speaking, the 
U.S. Military leads the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan under a larger 
umbrella of COIN strategy using CERP funding.  The U.S. State Department 
implements the majority of their construction funding through USAID.  The 
USAID model uses NGOs as implementing partners to complete construction in 
Afghanistan.  Another large ongoing reconstruction program is the National 
Solidarity Program that falls under the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development.  This can best be described as a grassroots program that allows 
the selected villages to select, manage, and construct their own development 
projects.  Each of these programs has different approaches to reconstruction and 
stabilization in conflict-affected environments which leads to different 
implementation goals and methodologies. 
A. BASIC CERP IMPLEMENTATION  
The Commander‟s Emergency Response Program originated in Iraq as a 
tool for commanders to quickly fund high impact humanitarian need projects 
aiding the local population.  The program was authorized for use in Afghanistan 
and maintains the same intent “to enable commanders to respond to urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements” (USFOR, 2011, p. 2).  The 
CERP program is indented for smaller projects, below $500K, that have a 
“positive impact” on the local population and meet the designated project 
selection criteria of: “(1) quick executability; (2) local national employment; (3) 
benefit to the Afghan population; (4) high visibility to the local populace; and (5) 
sustainability by (the government of Afghanistan) (for projects >$50K)” (USFOR, 
2011, p. 5).  The projects generally fall into three different categories including 
“reconstruction, death benefits/battle damage payments, and economic 
 38 
development” (Patterson & Robinson, 2011, p. 117).  This study is concerned 
specifically with the potential effect of construction projects and does not include 
CERP funds targeting other pillars and programs.   
The CERP program in Afghanistan has had documented success.  
Anecdotally, a group of interviewed U.S. military officers stated that “„where the 
road ends, the Taliban begins‟” (Crane, et al., 2009, p. 62).  Their personal 
experience using CERP showed how new roads allowed the military to increase 
secure areas as villages were connected.  Other groups took suggested CERP 
implementation guidelines to heart.  One military unit implemented a „shura to 
shovel‟ program that featured a two day deadline before project kickoff, and 
completed over 55 small projects that “produced clear benefits to the community 
and quickly galvanized the locals against insurgent encroachment” (Petit, 2011, 
p. 29).   
Unfortunately, there is a large amount of research that documents the 
shortcomings of this program.  Weggeland (2011) recently published a harsh 
criticism of the program claiming no overarching accountability measures or clear 
guidance have resulted in fueling “corruption, community insecurity and insurgent 
coercion” (pp. 2–3).  Other significant problems with the CERP program involve 
the procedures and design.  The CERP manuals and other military field manuals 
provide documentation on the theoretical best use of project funding, but 
execution is left up to commander‟s discretion.  Unfortunately, the commander 
may or may not have experience or education in stabilization and reconstruction.  
After providing any needed emergency relief, more complicated construction 
projects are generally the accepted next step towards stabilization.  The military 
often does not “have sufficient expertise” to implement construction projects 
resulting in a hit-or-miss stabilization effort (Patterson & Robinson, 2011, p. 117).  
Brosnan (2008) identified a serious lack of education for military members 
executing the CERP program.  The study indicated out of 1,000 Army officers 
surveyed 59 percent did not receive any training beyond program administration 
(Brosnan, 2008, pp. 3–4).  71 percent said they used subjective criteria to assess 
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success and 41 percent said they were not informed about the understood root of 
conflict in their assigned area (Brosnan, 2008, pp. 3–4).  Additionally, when 
commanders push for quick results, underdeveloped construction projects can 
result in unstaffed, unusable or unwanted facilities that create an easy insurgent 
target and a disenfranchised population (Patterson & Robinson, 2011, p. 118).  
Potentially the most critical issue with the CERP program is the theory behind 
project implementation.  The U.S. military is spending money in a village with the 
hope of endearing the population to the government.  This process inserts the 
U.S. into the state and population relationship, and typically demands some type 
of COIN population support in exchange for projects.  This action can actually 
undermine the legitimacy of the central government by highlighting the fact that 
they were not able to provide the service. 
B. PRT CERP IMPLEMENTATION  
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were established to help enhance 
CERP spending by developing stronger links between the villages and the 
provincial level government structure.  The three main functions of a PRT are to 
develop good governance, increase security and contract reconstruction 
activities (DOA, 2008, p. F-1).  PRT reconstruction activities target construction 
of schools, government buildings, health clinics and community centers (DOA, 
2008, p. F-2).  On paper U.S. PRTs are made up of a compilation of both military 
and State Department civilians from Civil Affairs, Military Police, Psychological 
Operations, Explosive Ordnance, Intelligence, Medical, administrative and 
infantry soldiers for security (Perito, 2005, pp. 4–5).  The U.S. is not alone as 
operators of Afghanistan PRTs.  The Canadian, British, German, and Italian 
forces all had a similar model and a separate regional responsibility for the 
mission (OCSR, 2006).  Project selection is conducted in a multi-step process.  
The original list is developed by the PRT through discussions with provincial 
government officials, national ministries, local citizens and published 
development plans (DOA, 2008, p. F-3).  Then the PRT engineer reviews 
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potential projects for technical feasibility, and finally the host-nation coordination 
team develops the funding priority in consultation with the provincial council 
(DOA, 2008, p. F-3).  PRT project execution differs from regular CERP by 
specifically linking the process of project ranking through the provincial 
government. 
This system has some stabilization success in Afghanistan.  The Gardez 
PRT sponsored a conference to discuss development plans that brought together 
100 local tribal elders and both local and national government officials to build 
strong governance ties  (OCSR, 2006, p. 10).  Additionally, PRT members are 
widely recognized as being more culturally sensitive and generally able to have 
better relationships with area leaders compared to their combat unit counterparts 
(Perito, 2005, p. 8). 
The PRT mission has also faced large amounts of criticism for the role 
played in Afghanistan.  Different governments and different approaches resulted 
in some creative solutions but, as a whole, the program lacked coordination, 
oversight and an overarching concept of operations (Perito, 2005, p. 1).  PRTs in 
many cases have blurred the civil-military line, and in the process “undermined 
the perceived neutrality” of NGOs “increasing the risk for aid workers” (Waldman, 
2008, p. 3).  Finally, even though PRTs are focused on stabilization, the 
personnel that are assigned to these units are still very under qualified for the 
task they face (Perito, 2005, p. 11). 
C. USAID PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION  
USAID falls under the U.S. State Department and their mission is to 
“support long-term and equitable economic growth” by supporting agriculture, 
trade, global health, humanitarian assistance and democracy around the world 
(USAID, 2011).  The execution of construction projects is typically through an 
implementing NGO partner that has experience and contacts in the area.  USAID 
also funnels reconstruction funding through local start up NGOs to help develop 
civil organizations.  USAID has adopted the nine principles of reconstruction and 
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development first published by Natsios (2005) of ownership, capacity building, 
sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and 
accountability (DOA, 2008, p. C-1).  These principles are closer to guidelines that 
are passed on to the implementing partner.  Most NGOs use some form of 
participatory process in selecting and developing projects.  The participatory 
process can be defined as making decisions through consensus without 
alienating group members (Social Impact Inc, 2005, p. 51).  After awarding 
projects, USAID works through the implementing partner to complete the work 
having less interaction with the local people and government compared to the 
PRT model.  The USAID model has a few distinct benefits including personnel 
that are better trained and experienced in stabilization and reconstruction efforts.  
Additionally, USAID works to develop a top-down and bottom-up approach to 
stabilization that connects government with community leaders during the 
process of infrastructure development (Social Impact Inc., 2005, p. 7).  USAID 
has the luxury of a more focused reconstruction mission and can use NGOs to 
plan for “mid to long-term focused projects with ensured sustainability” (Malan, 
2010, p. 46).   
USAID has had an overall positive impact on the country of Afghanistan.  
Their work has contributed to a drop in the infant mortality rate by 22 percent, 
resulted in more than 70,000 loans to women-owned business and developed 
infrastructure for the life changing technology of cellular phones with over 6.5 
million subscribers (USAID Asia, 2011). Unfortunately, Earl Gast, director of the 
USAID mission in Afghanistan in 2010, concluded past USAID operations were 
wasteful and checkered with failed reconstruction efforts (Cross, 2010, p. 10).  
Some problems that stem from this process begin with the many different 
implementing partners.  Completing construction through an implementing 
partner allows for some flexibility but, at times, resulted in a “community 
participation model” that was “not clearly articulated” (Social Impact Inc., 2005, p. 
51).  A previous Kabul USAID director was quoted as saying the organization 
“„lacked an overarching strategy‟” (Starr, 2011, p. 7).  Similar to the traditional 
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CERP model, NGO implementing partners increased delivery speed but 
bypassed the government, limiting capacity development and potentially 
undermined state legitimacy (Barakat, 2009, p. 111).   
D. NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM (NSP) 
The final method of project execution in this report is a review of the NSP 
under the MRRD.  The NSP is a CDD based program where members of the 
community band together to select, lobby for funding, contribute equity, manage 
and construct projects to better their individual villages.  The NSP first started in 
2003 with the goals to “deliver project-based community” development and 
“improve community governance” (IROA, 2010, p.73 ).  Villages with at least 25 
families qualify for the program and must elect a Community Development 
Council (CDC) (NSP, 2009, p. 2).  A CDC can request up to $60,000 to complete 
infrastructure or human capital development programs (IROA, 2010, p. 73).  
Unlike the other reconstruction program models, each project requires that the 
community commit some capital to the project in the form of funding, materials or 
labor.  There is also typically an implementing partner NGO that assists with the 
skilled work and human development aspects of the project (Barakat, 2009, p. 
115).  Under the NSP over 55,000 projects worth more than $800 million were 
completed in almost every Afghanistan district (National Solidarity Programme, 
2011).  These projects, with an average cost of $14,500, accessed 70% of the 
rural communities through the second phase of the program (National Solidarity 
Programme, 2011).  
The NSP has received wide praise for bringing together communities and 
building a foundation for democracy through development.  CDD projects are 
typically much smaller, more sustainable and better develop ownership through 
village participation (McNab & Mason, 2007, p. 366).  Ongoing evaluations of 
NSP have reported the creation of the village level development groups have 
resulted in greater improved “civic capacity,” “social relations” and “state 
legitimacy” (Barron, 2011, p. 1).  These projects are also being completed at a 30 
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percent less cost compared to the same work done by outside NGOs, according 
to World Bank estimates (Warner, 2007).  Part of this is the reduction in 
corruption that has plagued the Afghanistan reconstruction effort.  Villagers 
donate to the projects they want, work to bring the project in under budget and 
increase transparency to ensure spending is done correctly (Warner, 2007).  An 
amazing 75% of the households interviewed within NSP communities responded 
that the “national government was concerned about the welfare of their 
communities” (Barakat, 2009, p. 117).  As a result of the NSP program two 
communities turned in weapons caches and yet another defeated an insurgent 
attack without any U.S. or coalition forces involvement (Weggeland, 2011, p. 21).     
In some ways the NSP  is  a victim of its own success creating strong local 
CDCs that have taken the place of some other attempts to create “formal” 
governance structures.  The District Development Councils, the step above the 
CDCs, are creating friction between the MRRD and the Afghan Independent 
Directorate of Local Governance working to establish District Development 
Assemblies as relevant governance structures (UN Evaluation Office, 2009, p. 
52).  Thus far the anecdotal evidence showing improved security has not 
translated to larger studies.  Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2011) found the 
NSP did not reduce the likelihood of villages being attacked.  The process of 
supporting local ownership of projects and state governance creates a delicate 
balance between empowering local leaders and undermining national leadership 
(Hilhorst, Christoplos & Van Der Haar, 2010). 
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V. DATA DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS 
The focus of this study is to determine if different construction programs 
have any discernable difference in creating stability in a conflict-affected 
environment.  I began by compiling information on each of the construction 
programs previously discussed and matching unclassified datasets.  All of the 
construction data used in this study was retrieved through the DataCards 
program sponsored by the National Defense University 
(http://www.datacards.org).  DataCards is an index of data sources relating to 
irregular warfare worldwide.  Each of the individual data sources is rated for 
content, quality, and includes a description of the intended purpose.  The 
DataCard site also contains the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Database that 
tracks enemy activity specifically targeting or impacting NGOs working around 
the country.  The final source of data was the Worldwide Incident Tracking 
System (WITS) database sponsored by the U.S. National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC). 
Each of the projects in the construction databases were classified into 
categories based on the normalized CERP data categories.  These categories 
include agriculture, education, electricity, transportation, water and sanitation, 
civic clean up, healthcare, other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction, protective 
measures, repair of civic and cultural facilities, rule of law and governance, 
telecommunications and transportation.  Also, each project location province and 
district were normed for easier and more accurate comparison.    
A. DATA SET DESCRIPTION 
1. CERP Data Normalized 
The CERP Data Normalized dataset is compiled from raw data included in 
the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE).  CIDNE is a 
classified database that houses information on SIGACTs, Civil Affairs and 
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construction activities for theatre operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The 
normalized data was developed by a group from the Army organization TRADOC 
Analysis Center (TRAC) in an attempt to clean and format the information for 
easier analysis.  The data includes the originating organization, the type of CERP 
project, a short description of the work, the provincial location of the project, 
completed project date and the project cost.  I used the original CIDNE data to 
cross-reference the data to check for completeness and accuracy.  This normed 
dataset is the most complete and consistent of the available Afghanistan CERP 
datasets.  The original dataset contains 11,867 records spanning between 2003 
and 2011.   
I compared this dataset with the original CIDNE data and was able to 
further edit and remove 20 projects that were terminated after the normed 
dataset was generated.  Additional projects that were removed from the dataset 
were CERP activities such as battle damage and condolence payments.  The 
resulting database includes 5881 CERP construction related projects from 2003 
to 2010 in seventeen provinces.   
Figure 1.   Percent of Afghanistan CERP Construction by Province 
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An identified weakness in this dataset is inconsistent project descriptions.  
Additionally, the CERP construction program has received some criticisms that it 
concentrated too much money in Helmand province.  This is reflected in the data 
with 85 percent of the CERP construction projects within the study period located 
in Helmand province.  A subset of this information includes construction projects 
completed by U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan.  This data represents 241 projects 
valued at almost $18 million in the Helmand and Ghazni provinces between 2008 
to 2011. 
2. USAID Construction in Afghanistan 
The project database used in this study to analyze construction projects 
sponsored by USAID in Afghanistan is named the Afghanistan Infrastructure and 
Security Cartography System (AISCS).  The AISCS is a product developed by 
the Afghanistan Infrastructure Data Center (AIDC); a USAID funded program to 
track and report USAID and other NGO construction countrywide (AIDC, 2011).  
The program in Afghanistan is managed by the NGO International Relief and 
Development with a goal to “manage data collection, cataloging, mapping and 
reporting in support of Afghanistan‟s infrastructure development goals (AIDC, 
2011). The database includes the project name, reference number, project type, 
description, location, and project complete date.  The project was first funded in 
2004 in an attempt to pull together all the reconstruction and stability work being 
accomplished in Afghanistan by USAID.  Since its inception, the AIDC has 
provided extensive infrastructure and security-related information on a regular 
basis in the form of maps and catalogues to the USAID Afghanistan mission, the 
U.S. Embassy, ISAF, IRoA ministries and other international donors. In 2009, the 
program expanded to include all projects completed by donor agencies including 
other NGOs and military organizations.  In order to manage the growing 




for the AIDC with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers – Afghanistan Engineering 
District North (USACE AED-N) and the U.S. National Geospatial-intelligence 
Agency (NGA). 
The original data includes 43,000 total projects completed between 2003 
and 2011.  The information within the database continues to be refined and 
updated.  For this study, I reviewed the projects included in the database and 
only included projects that had construction related activities.  Where possible 
blanks in the record were interpreted based on the information available.   
 
Figure 2.   Percent of Afghanistan USAID Sponsored Construction by Province 
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The majority of the projects did not include specific geolocation but did 
include province and district location.  Entries that were incomplete were 
removed from consideration.  Many others were removed from consideration 
because they did not include construction as the aid mechanism.  This database 
has some inconsistencies in information and very little documentation information 
on project cost.  The result was a project list including 2,467 entries during the 
study analysis period between 2003 and 2010.  
3. MRRD Construction in Afghanistan 
The MRRD has several programs to develop rural regions throughout the 
country, but the NSP is the largest and best well known.  The MRRD 
approximates that 70% of rural communities in Afghanistan have received 
projects through this $800 million initiative (NSP, 2011).  The information on the 
NSP projects was taken from the MRRD database of more than 55,000 records 
of development projects.  The database includes information on the specific 
program of execution under the MRRD, date completed, description of work, 
project cost, and location.  The database has been reviewed for accuracy by 
outside groups and continues to be standardized and updated by the MRRD.  
The data includes information on 37,779 projects from both phases of the NSP 
program beginning in 2002 and continuing through the end of 2010.  Entries from 
the original database were not included if the project did not include a physical 
construction process.  As an example, if a village received machinery for future 
projects it was not included.  But, a project was included for example if the result 
of the materials or equipment purchased also included physical construction.  
Figure 3 shows that not only is the distribution of the NSP fairly uniform, the 
emphasis on rural development is apparent with only 1 percent of the 
construction awarded in Helmand province. 
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Figure 3.   Percent of Afghanistan NSP Construction by Province 
4. NGO Safety Data 
The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) collects information on 
incidents aimed at or affecting NGOs operating in the country.  The ANSO 
produces quarterly reports that attempt to analyze the trends of incidents against 
NGOs reviewing types, causes, locations and casualties.  The information is 
geolocated and includes the incident data, details, casualties and the type of 
attack.  The growing database features 1,230 incidents between 2003 and 2011.  
These incidents are reported by NGOs that experience violent activities directed 
at their organization.  This information is a descriptor of the stability and support 
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for stability activities in a conflict-affected environment.  NGOs typically try to 
represent an independent third party that does not have a political agenda for 
control.  Most publish primary goals of supplying humanitarian aid without any 
obligation for the population to supply something in return.  When insurgent 
forces target NGOs they risk undermining popular support for their cause.  In 
areas where these violent acts occur, insurgent groups are likely more 
entrenched and have more control over the population.  As a limitation, the 
database is sparsely populated in the first two years of recorded data but has 
become more complete and accurate overtime.  Also, prior to the establishment 
of the ANSO office, the data between 2003 and Aug 2009 had to be compiled 
from multiple sources and therefore is not as reliable as data collected by the 
office itself. 
5. WITS 
The Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data is compiled by the 
U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) (https://wits.nctc.gov/).  The WITS 
data includes 9,383 geolocated entries containing detailed information on 
terrorist incidents in Afghanistan from 2004 until 2010 including the date, type, 
description and tracking number.  The NCTC defines terrorism when “groups or 
individuals acting on political motivation deliberately or recklessly attack 
civilians/non-combatants or their property and the attack does not fall into 
another special category of political violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal 
violence” (WITS, 2011).  Each of the incidents in the database for Afghanistan 
are taken from open source reporting generated by the media, police forces, 
military forces or NGOs.  The incident is recorded if it fits the NCTC definition of 
terrorism and only when the action was actually executed.  Planned or disrupted 
attacks are not included.  The entries also include, if known, the group or 
organization responsible for the incident.  Figure 4 reveals a distinctive trend of 
increased in violence in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2011.   
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Figure 4.   Recorded WITS Incidents per month in Afghanistan   
The description of the incident includes information on the target.  Many of 
these incidents targeted the state government.  The struggle of an insurgent 
group against the state is core to stability in a conflict-affected environment.  In 
an effort to better understand the affect of construction on stability I customized 
the WITS data to include a list that only includes attacks directly against 
government officials and facilities.  Within the existing data, 5,258 incidents can 
be clearly identified as attacks against a government target.   
Another good measure of stability is to track the act of hostage taking 
(Kilcullen, 2009, p.9).  If local officials and pro-government supporters are being 
taken at a high rate by the insurgent forces it demonstrates the inability of the 
state to secure the area and protect their population.  Additionally, it sends a 
signal to the remaining population that the insurgent force have raised the costs 
for active and passive support of the state.  However, low kidnapping rates do 
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not imply state support (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 9).  These areas could simply be 
under the control of the insurgent force.  Within the existing WITS data, 737 
records documented the act of hostage taking in 33 of 34 Afghanistan provinces 
between April 2004 and May 2010.   
B. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Data Refinement 
Each database was further refined, shaped and standardized for analysis 
in this study.  Each of the reconstruction and stabilization project databases were 
reviewed and trimmed to include only the completed construction projects.  
Governance, education or other development projects were only included if the 
construction of a physical structure was at the heart of the project.  Since 
Afghanistan has changed both provincial and district boundaries so every project 
and incident location was reviewed and, if necessary, normed into a standard 34 
provinces and 329 districts.  The data had to be further cleaned to eliminate 
special characters and formats incompatible with ArcGIS.   
2. Unit of Analysis 
To test the potential affect of construction on stability, I first sorted each of 
the data sets by location and date.  The CERP dataset only includes the 
provincial location of completed projects.  Both the NSP and USAID data 
includes a finer granularity of project location.  The completed projects of these 
programs include district and, in some cases, village locations.  Unfortunately, 
analysis at the village level was not possible because of the lack of geolocation 
of the villages in Afghanistan and the wide variety of spelling for individual 
villages.  Additionally, the location information for CERP projects more specific 
than the provincial level is classified.   
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3. Regression and Correlation Analysis  
I then established the null hypothesis; there is no significant effect of 
construction (IV) on violence (DV).  Using both statistical regression and 
correlation in Excel, I tested each of the construction methods against both the 
WITS and ANSO incident databases.  Projects at both the district and province 
level were compared by month they were completed with any incidents that 
occurred that same month.  I completed two different comparisons using the 
number and location of construction projects undertaken as well as the cost and 
location of these projects.  This was done to include the USAID data into the 
comparison as the USAID project database did not include individual project 
cost.  Measuring the value of each project has both benefits and drawbacks.  
Using the dollar amount per project could potentially show a clear correlation 
between a given level of effort and the reduction in violence.  However, the cost 
of an individual project can vary a great deal between the reconstruction 
programs studied making a direct comparison hard.  Using the project as an 
individual unit does not test the input of funding into the stability equation but 
looks at construction as a intrinsically beneficial act bringing a society together.  
The downside of using the number of completed projects is a measure of scale 
between larger and smaller projects.  Excel was used to run the regression and 
correlation of the data occurring between January 2003 and December 2010. 
4. Geospatial Analysis 
ArcGIS was used to plot both the projects and violence at the provincial 
and district level throughout Afghanistan.  Each project or incident was plotted 
according to the best known location.  Some USAID projects included exact 
geolocation while other projects had location information that included only the 
province in which the construction was executed.  I used the provincial or district 
geographical center as the completion location when exact coordinates were not 
available.  All of the violence data was plotted according to the exact geolocation 
available in the data. 
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5. Temporal Analysis 
Each of the datasets included the date construction was completed or 
when the incident occurred.  ArcGIS has an available feature that allows this date 
to be included in the properties of the created map layer.  This allowed me to 
display projects and violence month by month over the same period of time 
analyzed using Excel regression and correlation.  These layers can be 
assembled in different combinations to aid analysis over time.   
C. RESULTS  
1. Regression and Correlation 
Table 1 contains the regression results of the number of construction 
projects compared to violence at the provincial level of analysis.  The overall 
trend discovered was CERP and NSP construction projects have a statistically 
significant role in stability.  All CERP regressions had strong T-Statistics with a 
very high degree of confidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is no affect 
of construction on violence.  The CERP program had the strongest correlation 
out of the programs reviewed including a correlation with the WITS data equaling 
0.199.  All CERP regression results in Table 1 also indicate a positive 
relationship with violence.  This trend is very small, and can be explained by the 
core CERP philosophy of money as a weapons system.  CERP projects are 
typically placed in more populated areas with insurgent activity and existing 
violence to influence the population.  The results also indicate that CERP 
construction activities did not decrease violence.  Additionally, the largest trend 
indicates for every 17 projects only one additional violent incident occurs.  Better 
application of the construction could potentially reverse this trend increasing 














Projects       
(All Provinces) 
0.0598*** 0.0039--- 0.0313*** 0.0148*** 
(5.090) _ (4.343) (3.042) (1.616) _ 
R-squared 0.04 0.0002 0.031 0.16 






-0.129 -0.1234* -0.0466 -0.0626 
(9.553) (4.083) (6.173) (3.394) 
R-squared 0.012 0.040 0.0026 0.0213 
Observations 72 72 72 72 
 
USAID 
Projects      
(All Provinces) 0.0785*** 0.0085 0.0089 0.0041 
 (5.188)             (4.344) (3.091) (1.637) 
R-squared 0.003 4.65E-5 9.91E-5 7.7E-5 





-0.0297*** -0.0086** -0.0169*** -0.0006*** 
(1.093) (4.34) (3.069) (1.630) 
R-squared 0.02 0.002 0.014 0.01 
Observations 2856 2856 2856 2856 
Error associated with the regression is listed in parentheses.   
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
Table 1.   Regression Results:  Number of Completed Projects Constructed by 
Program Compared With Violence at the Provincial Level 
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Table 1 also shows the overall strong relationship between the NSP 
projects and violence.  The NSP regressions resulted in either a very statistically 
significant or statistically significant relationship reducing violence.  This trend 
indicates that CDD programs like the NSP can help create stability in conflict-
affected environments.  The NSP and WITS regression coefficient in Table 1 also 
indicates the NSP program reduced about five violent acts on average, per 
province, per year.  The Figure 4 WITS histogram illustrates the increasing 
violence in Afghanistan over time.  A comparison of the two trends results in an 
absolute change of 0.1362  between the NSP and WITZ coefficients during the 
same time.  The negative trend the NSP program achieved in this environment is 
noteworthy considering the substantial obstacles to the program‟s success.    
 The null hypothesis for the CERP projects implemented by the PRT 
cannot be rejected.  I cannot conclude that PRT implemented CERP has a 
significant effect on violence.  All of the PRT construction reported in the CERP 
Normed Database fell into two provinces:  Ghazni and Helmand.  This resulted in 
only 72 observations and, consequently, there was not enough data to be able to 
draw a stronger correlation.  USAID comparison resulted in a high confidence to 
reject the null hypothesis when comparing the WITS data only.   The USAID 
regression at the provincial level proves to be inconclusive with the lowest 
confidence of any comparison.  All the USAID project comparisons resulted in a 
slightly positive correlation with violence, but are so slight the increase is 
negligible. 
Table 2 shows the results of the regression of three programs at the 
provincial level using project cost, in U.S. dollars, as the unit of measure.  Again 
the CERP program construction was very statistically significant when compared 
against each measure of violence.  All of the regression coefficients were slightly 
positive, but very small.  This is noteworthy considering CERP are placed 
specifically where greater violence is occurring.  NSP also resulted in three of 
four categories as statistically significant at the one percent level.  The NSP 
regression coefficients are not as large when using dollars compared to using 
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individual projects as the unit of measure.  This could indicate the cost of a NSP 
project is not as important as the project itself.  PRT projects did have a very 
statistically significant result when compared to the total WITS database.  Better 
data and research into this result could yield a greater negative violence trend.  
Finally, only CERP projects using cost as a unit of measure had a very 
statistically significant relationship with the hostage incidents recorded by the 
WITS database. 
Table 2.   Regression Results:  Cost of Completed Projects Constructed by Program 













Projects     
(All Provinces) 
3E-8*** 2.81E-7*** 1.5E-7*** 0.00000001*** 
(5.145) _ (4.284) (3.057) (1.626) _ 
R-squared 0.02 0.027 0.015 0.013 
Observations 2856 2856 2856 2856 
 
PRT Projects 




-1E-6*** -5.59E-7 -1.03E-6 -3E-7 
(9.5647)    (4.137) (6.111) (3.4224) _ 
R-squared 0.009 0.0147 0.0225 0.0047 





-2E-6*** -4.03E-7* -8.9E-7*** -4E-7*** 
(5.159)    (4.341) (3.0711) (1.631) _ 
R-squared 0.01 0.001 0.0126 0.007 
Observations 2856 2856 2856 2856 
Error associated with the regression is listed in parentheses.   
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
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Table 3 has the results of the USAID and NSP construction projects 
compared to violence at the district level.  The only USAID regression statistically 
significant is the comparison with NGO violence.  This positive relationship with 
violence could occur because of the majority of the NGO violence database 
consists of reports made by USAID implementing partners.  The remainder of the 
USAID comparisons are not statistically significant at effecting violence.  The 
NSP projects, again, resulted in a statistically significant relationship reducing 
violence in three of four violence databases. 
Table 3.   Regression Results:  Number of Completed Projects Constructed by 
Program Compared With Violence at the District Level 
The final regression results table, Table 4, is the cost of the NSP projects 
compared to violence at the district level of analysis.  The final comparison also 
resulted in statistically significant regression coefficient values in three of four 
categories of violence.  The regression result for NSP projects are more 














0.0094 -0.0037 0.0003 0.0057** 
(1.094) (1.2367) (0.6746) (0.3342) _ 
R-squared 4.95E-5 5.93E-6 1.43E-7 0.0002 





-0.0038** -0.0025 -0.0024** -0.0015*** 
(1.0937)    (1.2367) (0.6745) (0.3342) _ 
R-squared 0.0002 5.14E-5 0.0002 0.0002 
Observations 33600 33600 33600 33600 
Error associated with the regression is listed in parentheses.   
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
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project cost.  This same pattern occurs at both the district and provincial level 

















-2.25E-7** -1.36E-7 -1.27E-7** -8.7E-8*** 
(1.0937)    (1.2367) (0.6745) (0.3342) _ 
R-squared 0.0002 4.85E-5 0.0001 0.0002 
Observations 33600 33600 33600 33600 
Error associated with the regression is listed in parentheses.   
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
Table 4.   Regression and Correlation Results:  Construction and Refined Violence  
CERP USAID NSP
Agriculture 12.8% 0.0% 18.3%





Education 14.2% 19.0% 2.0%
Electricity 5.0% 0.0% 15.6%
Food Production And 
Distribution
0.3% 0.0% 1.6%
Healthcare 8.6% 23.5% 0.3%






Protective Measures 2.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Repair Of Civic And 
Cultural Facilities
7.9% 3.4% 3.5%
Rule Of Law And 
Governance
4.3% 1.8% 0.0%
Telecommunications 0.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Transportation 16.9% 4.2% 30.2%
Water And Sanitation 18.2% 44.4% 28.3%  
Table 5.   Construction Percentage by Type Based on Number of Projects 
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There are a few notable trends that are throughout all of the results.  
CERP construction has the largest impact on attacks against the state.  The 
CERP regression coefficient, 0.0313, and correlation, 0.0176, is larger than all 
other methods for projects as the unit of measure.  This could be related to the 
amount of CERP construction that is focused on increasing state capacity.   
The three top state related categories are Protective Measures, Repair of 
Civic and Cultural Facilities and Rule of Law and Government.  These categories 
of construction accounted for 15 percent of CERP projects compared to only 5.2 
and 3.6 percent of USAID and NSP construction respectively.  Additionally, the 
majority of the CERP projects were constructed in the same area where 18 
percent of the total violence occurred.   
 
Figure 5.   Percent of Total Recorded WITS and ANSO Violence by Province 
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Figure 6.   Number of Recorded WITS Incidents and NSP Projects:  Afghanistan 
(top) and S.E. Afghanistan (bottom) 
 Legend 
NSP(#)          WITS Incidents (#) 
 Legend 
NSP(#)          WITS Incidents (#) 
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The NSP projects also show an interesting relationship to recorded WITS 
government attacks.  The NSP regressions in every comparison resulted in 
statistical significance at the 1 percent or 5 percent level.  Furthermore, all of the 
regression coefficients were negative, indicating a decrease in violence targeting 
the state.  The NSP is doing more than any other construction program in linking 
the state government to its population.   
2. Geospatial Analysis Results 
Each of the projects and the violence from the examined datasets were 
plotted using ArcGIS.  ArcGIS allows the user to examine the geospatial aspect 
of the refined data.  All of the violence data is plotted exactly where the incident 
occurred using latitude and longitude.  The CERP data for CERP and PRT 
projects were placed at the geographical center of the province where the 
construction occurred.  The NSP projects are plotted at the district where the 
work occurred.  Finally, the USAID completed projects are plotted at the exact 
latitude and longitude, if the information was available, or at the district center.  
All of the information plotted was  projected onto the Afghanistan map using the 
WGS1984 datum and Mercator projection.  The points vary in size based on the 
number of projects or incidents that occurred at that location.  Plots of individual 
datasets are available in Appendix C.  
The result of NSP projects and WITS incidents geospatially is displayed 
seen in Figure 6.  One of the striking visuals this comparison displays is the vast 
coverage of the NSP.  The majority of the violence is located in more populated 
areas that ring the country.  There are many NSP project locations where there is 
little to no violence reported.  This is more clear in the bottom half of the frame 
where the figure focuses on the southeast portion of the country for greater 
acuity.  This figure is a striking representation of the relationship between 
recorded violence and NSP construction.  More violence occurred where fewer 
NSP projects were completed.   
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Figure 7.   Number of Recorded WITS State Targeted Incidents and NSP 
Projects:  Afghanistan (top) and S.E. Afghanistan (bottom) 
 Legend 
NSP(#)          WITS State Target(#) 
 Legend 
NSP(#)          WITS State Target(#) 
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The next geospatial analysis discussed is the relationship between the 
NSP and violence from the WITS database targeted at the state.  The majority of 
the violence targeted at the state is located in more populated areas.  This is true 
of all recorded violence.  However, the recorded violence against the state also 
occurred in areas without a large NSP footprint.  A notable spatial representation 
of this data is on the bottom of Figure 7.  This figure enhances the case that the 
NSP strengthens the relationship between the population and the state.   
The CERP projects in relationship to attacks targeted against the state are 
displayed in Figure 8.  The CERP projects appear to also have a correlation with 
attacks against the state.  Unlike the NSP projects, more state attacks occur in 
the same area as completed CERP projects.  Some of this can be explained by 
the chosen location and type of the CERP projects.  This relationship can also be 
explained by the limited distribution of CERP construction across the country.  
The CERP program chose to target specific areas key to building capacity in the 
Afghanistan government.  This limited the potential impact of the CERP 
construction program in building stability.  Concentrating CERP construction in 
one location can also contribute to local inflation, capture, and oversaturation of 
the economy. 
The last geospatial figure included in this study is the plot of CERP 
construction and recorded WITS incidents.  The location of the CERP 
construction is in areas where violence occurred.  This correlation is more clear 
in the lower portion of Figure 9.  The CERP program is specifically designed to 
be implemented in areas of greater violence in an attempt to reduce violence.  
The possibility that less violence would have occurred if the CERP work was not 
completed in these areas cannot be proved with the available data.   
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Figure 8.   Number of Recorded WITS State Targeted Incidents and CERP 
Projects in S.E. Afghanistan 
 Legend 
CERP (#)      WITS State Target (#) 
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Figure 9.   Number of Recorded WITS Violence and CERP Construction:  
Afghanistan (top) and S.E. Afghanistan (bottom) 
 Legend 
CERP(#)        WITS Incidents (#) 
 Legend 
CERP(#)        WITS Incidents (#) 
 68 
3. Temporal Analysis Results 
Another feature of ArcGIS is the ability to display data that contains a 
temporal component.  The construction data and the recorded violent incidents 
contain a construction complete date or incident date respectively.  The available 
project and violence data were examined over time using ArcGIS to determine if 
any patterns or relationships could be explained.  As previously argued, if 
construction is implemented maximizing ownership and development of a civil 
society the impact should be decreased violence.  The act of construction has 
the potential to develop stronger societies and, after the completion of each 
project, another measure of social development is completed.  The most recent 
data is displayed on the map as a large icon and each event icon shrinks over 
time.  The different combinations of construction and violence, plotted in six 
month intervals to further investigate this relationship, are located in Appendix D.  
A six-month interval was chosen to represent yearly highs and lows of violence.   
The first set of temporal analysis figures are a comparison of the NSP 
projects and the WITS violence data between January 2004 and July 2010.  This 
series of snapshots show the NSP projects in yellow spreading out throughout 
the country over time.  The majority of the recorded violence, displayed in red, is 
located in areas of fewer competed NSP projects.  This is not conclusive proof 
that NSP construction drives down violence but the graphic is striking visual 
evidence.  The density of completed projects by month and year are displayed in 
the same panel. 
The second set of temporal figures review the spread of the recorded 
violence over time.  The plotted WITS data and violence targeting NGOs 
displayed by year are also located in Appendix D.  This panel of mapped data 
shows that the early violence was predominantly in the Southeast portion of the 
country.  Significant violence began occurring in the northern part of the country 
by July 2006.  The violence that encircled the country by the summer of 2009 
was still predominantly in Afghanistan‟s more populated areas.  Included in this 
 69 
panel of maps is a data clock showing the density of violent incidents by month 
and year.  Violence increased steadily overtime, specifically during the summer 
months when the insurgency mounted a new offensive. 
A closer look at the potential impact of the NSP on violence targeted at the 
state is also included in Appendix D.  The linear regression relationship 
discovered between the NSP and violence targeted at the state indicated the 
CDD style construction reduced violence against the state.  The temporal 
analysis conducted on this relationship reinforces this finding.  While overall 
violence in Afghanistan increased between 2006 and 2010, state targeted 
violence occurred in areas predominately void of the NSP influence.  Increasing 
the NSP development helped create a stronger tie between the population and 
state government.  This appears to have a direct influence on the attacks 
targeted at the state.   
The final temporal review is the relationship between the CERP program 
and recorded violence in the WITS database.  The CERP construction program 
strategy was different than the NSP.  The CERP construction was concentrated 
in just a few places around the country where it was determined critical to 
develop state capacity.  The amount of CERP construction was also limited in the 
earlier time period reviewed.  While violence encircled the country, the CERP 
construction program lagged significantly in branching out to other areas beyond 
the capital region.  This time lag is part of the reason that CERP construction and 
violence had a positive regression coefficient.  CERP money was spent in areas 
where violence had already become a problem instead of in areas where 
violence could be prevented by developing social capital through construction.   
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study of the impact construction can have on stability looked at 
different implementation methodology currently used in Afghanistan.  I have 
found that the act of construction provides a distinct and significant impact on 
violence in the studied conflict-affected environment.  The use of CERP and NSP 
programs are both statistically significant in impacting violence.  The regression 
and visual comparison of CERP construction resulted in a increase in violence.  
This relationship can be explained by the current CERP implementation strategy.  
The U.S. military uses CERP as a bargaining chip to increase popular support for 
the counterinsurgency effort.  This can undermine the relationship between the 
population and state.  The relationship between population and state will 
ultimately be what creates long-term stability in a conflict-affected environment.   
Of all the options for construction the NSP shows the greatest benefits in 
conflict-affected environments reviewed in this study.  The NSP process is shown 
to be the most cost efficient and provides significant opportunity to develop 
human capital.  The NSP is documented to increase the bond between 
population and state in conducted surveys and linear regression conducted in 
this report.  The NSP strengthens state legitimacy by proving state utility through 
providing services to the population.  The program also allowed the state to 
provide exclusive benefits for the villages that met the established criteria to 
receive a project.  This process helped co-opt the villages into the state run 
program creating a deeper investment in creating a beneficial outcome.  The 
projects developed were more desired by the population because the population, 
not an NGO or military representative, make the decision on what to build.  The 
NSP greater increased participation and ownership compared to other forms of 
construction creating greater social capital.  The NSP led to a reduction in 
violence and an increase in stability, during a time period where overall violence 
increased throughout the country.   
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Construction can be used to significantly impact violence.  Programs using 
CDD techniques like the NSP had the greatest impact on creating stability in 
conflict-affected environments.  Unfortunately, the U.S. has spent a great deal of 
time and money attempting to build our way towards stability using other 
methodologies that are not as successful.  The U.S. sponsored construction 
processes have not been used to their potential to reduce violence and create 
stability.  This severely limited the potential impact of the CERP construction 
program in building stability.  Overall there is significant potential to better the 
relatively small regression coefficients through careful program implementation 
and reduction of corruption that currently plagues Afghanistan.  Better 
management could reverse the trend creating a more stable environment. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations for policy considerations can be extracted from the 
study findings.  The tangible benefits of construction provide known and 
measureable benefits developing the local and national economy.  However, this 
study shows that construction in Afghanistan has not made a significant impact 
on increasing stability through the reduction of violence in this conflict-affected 
environment.  The following recommendations are made for consideration by 
policy makers.   
1. Strike the Right Balance  
The balance between international coalitions and the host nation 
managing development is sometimes hard to reach.  In a conflict-affected 
environment development should begin as soon as possible with outside 
agencies likely being the only feasible organizations able to get construction 
underway.  Whenever possible, the international group should empower the host 
nation to implement their own development program.  Only smaller-scale projects 
may be possible at first, but with targeted training, larger projects will soon be 
feasible.  Until that time, larger-scale projects are better executed through 
 73 
international capability to speed project completion and raise quality of critical 
infrastructure development such as the electrical grid.  Using CDD can speed 
delivery of services, link the population with the state and give the community a 
stake in its success.  CDD done correctly by emphasizing transparency and 
accountability for the money spent on the program will help keep more money in 
the targeted communities, generate more employment and build host nation 
capacity for construction and all associated industries. 
2. Clear Program Goals 
Each of the construction methodologies reviewed in this study suffered 
from unclear execution guidance or unclear program goals.  Organization should 
be clear about the true purpose of the stabilization and reconstruction efforts.  
Are they to provide jobs for the local economy or used as barging chips for 
information?  What are the expectations of the program?  Is this program simply 
political cover for the larger battle against insurgents?  PRT teams never were 
given specific guidance during the establishment of the program nor were U.S. 
and coalition teams.  The CERP program is historically at the mercy of individual 
commanders to develop the local program when many commanders do not have 
any education or experience in stabilization and reconstruction activities.  The 
USAID also suffered from diverging priorities and an unclear strategic vision.  
Additionally, NGOs are at the mercy of what donors are willing to support, 
making focused long term programs difficult.  Finally, the NSP was designed to 
create ties between the state and population developed friction when state 
government conflicted with CDCs.  These are just a few examples of the need to 
supply and continually update program guidance.  Without clear guidance, 
individual units are bound to lose ground with the constant shifting of priorities by 
local commanders.  Clear program goals are also needed to achieve greater 




Education should be the corner stone for all members implementing any 
reconstruction and stabilization program.  International and coalition forces need 
to be better educated on the potential impact of construction to develop stronger 
state function through CDD.  This education needs to go beyond the rules of 
CERP spending and focus on the broader pillars of reconstruction.  If the U.S. 
chooses to continue to employ stabilization and reconstruction activities as a 
major emphasis in a counterinsurgency policy, it is only fitting that education is 
paired with the emphasis given. 
4. Maximize Impact of Individual Programmatic Elements 
When specific guidance is given on stabilization and reconstruction 
programs it often reads like a laundry list intended to fit every circumstance 
conceivable.  While it may not be possible to predict future situations, it is 
possible to review the impact of past stabilization programs.  This report focused 
on the impact of construction on stability.  What it found was that construction is 
significantly linked to stability but, in Afghanistan, construction only accounted for 
a small effect on stability.  The potential for stabilization through construction 
were not reached.  Understanding the impact of individual elements within the 
construct of a larger strategy allows for greater tailoring and customization.  
Increasing the impact of the individual portions of a stabilization and 
reconstruction program will likely increase the overall program impact. 
5. Sequencing Construction First 
All the benefits of construction can be used as the focus of the 
stabilization process.  Construction can provide the foundation to build 
governance capacity, develop the rule of law through commerce and trade, 
provide social development with jobs all while reviving the economy.  Putting 
reconstruction at the top of the agenda shows the population that the state can 
provide services quickly after direct confrontation has ended.  In many situations 
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the list of state functions that require development is long and there are many 
competing priorities.  Attempting to do everything at once spreads resources thin 
and, without early results, the population is likely to lose faith in the capability of 
the government.  Providing these services will allow a government to maintain 
ties with the population and build trust by providing results. 
6. Understand the Potential for Negative Impact 
Each culture will have a different definition of terms like corruption, greed, 
capture, and bias.  However, all of these factors occur in every culture and can 
be exacerbated by introducing construction projects into the community.  Aid can 
create additional resentment in a community instead of creating greater trust.  It 
is important to understand how these projects are implemented change the 
dynamic of power among the population.  People will fight to maintain their status 
as a local powerbroker or increase their status with a new contract award.  
Assuring that the project decision making process is as open and transparent as 
possible will help reduce the negative impact of inserting money into a 
community.  Project funding should be given only with transparent accounting to 
help eliminate the potential for capture and get more of the positive impact 
distributed throughout the community.   
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
1. Impact of Individual Elements of Stabilization  
This study showed the impact of construction on stabilization.  Future 
study can be done on of each of the individual elements within a stabilization 
program to draw out their specific effect.  Understanding the individual impact will 
help customize future approaches to stabilization and reconstruction.  It will also 
help determine possible more effective combinations and sequencing of 
approaches. 
 76 
2. Survey the Recipients’ Opinion 
The true impact of a stabilization program may be best determined by 
asking the recipient for their opinions on the process.  A survey can be 
developed and implemented that isolates construction from other stabilization 
activities to determine if the process was conducted in a manner that reinforces 
stability. 
3. Breakdown the Results By Region 
It can be argued that each culture will have a different perception to the 
same stabilization and reconstruction programs.  Determining the differences in 
culture among different regions of the country and then controlling for the cultural 
differences could improve future findings.  
4. Develop CERP Construction Study  
The possibility that less violence would have occurred if CERP 
construction was placed in other areas in Afghanistan cannot be proven with the 
available data.  This relationship needs to be better explored to determine the 
potential impact of CERP construction by setting up a study to control for 
experimental variables.  The U.S. should carefully select locations with similar 
size, historical violence levels, ethnic background.  Then designate half a control 
area while the other half receives CERP funding for construction.  Only after a 
deliberate study of these methods will the true impact of CERP in conflict-
affected environments be determined.   
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Theoretically, by maximizing social capital, legitimacy, participation, 
providing exclusive benefits construction activities, can help stabilize a conflict-
affected environment.  The goal of these activities must be more than physical 
reconstruction.  Unfortunately, a great deal of the aid dedicated for Afghanistan 
will never make it to the people who need it.  Estimates of as much as 40 percent 
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of Afghan aid was returned to donor countries (Waldman, 2008, p. 6).  The 
efforts of the CERP, USAID and NSP programs are working to stabilize 
Afghanistan but need help to be successful. The reconstruction and development 
effort must link society and state to create the social contract between population 
and government.  The state needs to supply unique services to the population 
and include them in a system of representation to co-opt the people increasing 
ownership in the state system to be successful.  Years of war have seriously 
degraded the level of trust and social capital in Afghanistan, and these attributes 
will take a great deal of time to repair.  The development of significant social 
capital after three decades of continuous conflict could take another 30 years.  
More effective spending and oversight is needed if these programs are to make a 
significant difference in reconstructing Afghanistan for the future. 
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APPENDIX C:  GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS FIGURES 
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 Legend 
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Completed PRT Construction Projects by Location and Number 
 Legend 
PRT Projects (#)           
 90 
 





NPS Projects (#)           
 91 
APPENDIX D:  TEMPORAL ANALYSIS FIGURES 
 
 
Number of Completed NSP Construction Projects and WITS Violent Incidents:   
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Spread of WITS and NGO Targeted Violence by Number:  Jul 2004 - Jul 2010 
and WITS Violence by Month and Year (Lower Left) 
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Completed NSP Projects and WITS Violence Targeting the State by Number:   
Jul 2007 - Jan 2011 
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